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ABSTRACT
What is the magnitude of credit constraint affecting small businesses? This paper
provides estimate of the credit gap – defined as the difference between the desired and
actual levels of debt for credit constrained small businesses. The estimated credit gap is
approximately 20 percent, i.e., credit constrained small business on the average would
desire 20 percent more debt. This credit gap varies considerably across industries, with
manufacturing firms facing a significantly larger gap than firms in the wholesale or
service industries.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A growing body of empirical literature on small business lending suggests that credit
constraint affects a significant proportion of small businesses; yet there is no estimate on
the magnitude of this constraint.1 The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the
magnitude of this credit constraint or credit gap (defined as the difference between the
observed and the desired level of debt). Ideally measuring the credit gap involves
identifying credit-constrained borrowers – i.e., borrowers that did not apply for a loan,
fearing denial of application; firms that were unable to acquire the amount for which
they applied; and small businesses that do not have credit in their balance sheets. Such
data is rarely available for small businesses. Fortunately, data from the National Survey
of Small Business Finances (NSSBF, 1988–1989 and 1993) provide direct evidence on
credit-constrained firms, i.e., firms that did not apply for a loan fearing denial and firms
that were unable to acquire the amount for which they applied -- specifically questions
J53 and J12 of the survey.
In theory, a significant credit gap is expected for small businesses due to acute
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Under information
asymmetries, the excess demand for credit is partly due to the fact that lenders are
unable to identify (and charge higher rates to) high-risk borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). In equilibrium, lenders will resort to rationing credit than use the interest rate as
a market-clearing device (i.e., charge the less creditworthy borrowers higher rates of
interest to compensate for the credit risk). Petersen and Rajan (1995) describe how
initial asymmetric information creates adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
which banks charge high rates initially and reduce rates in later periods after borrower
types have been revealed. While anecdotal evidence on the severity of credit constraint
among small business periodically surfaces in business press and policy discussions,
evidence on the magnitude of this gap is nonexistent, mostly due to the absence of
appropriate data.2 Our results indicate that on average, credit-constrained small
businesses desire 20 percent more debt. While there is extensive empirical work on
measuring the credit gap for households, to the best of our knowledge we provide the
first evidence on the magnitude of credit gap at the firm level for small businesses (see
Hayashi (1985), Jappelli (1990), Duca and Rosenthal (1993), and Cox and Jappelli
(1993)) for empirical evidence on credit gap for households). Our study extends the
liquidity constraint literature on households and on relationship lending to small
business finances.
Our empirical work highlights the importance of the selection biases inherent in
quantifying desired debt. Any attempt to estimate the desired debt requires identifying a
subsample of firms that have positive debt and are unconstrained in the credit market.
Extending the econometric findings to all small businesses, however, requires that we
control for differences between firms that are credit constrained and those that are
unconstrained, and firms that have debt and those that have no debt.3 Our estimates of
sample selection term coefficients confirm that the subsample is indeed nonrandom, that
unobserved factors which increase the probability of holding debt also increase the
demand for desired debt, and that unobserved factors which increase the probability of
being credit constrained reduce the demand for desired debt.
Finally, we provide evidence on how credit gap varies by firm characteristics. For
example, manufacturing, wholesale, and service firms experience the largest credit gap,
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and utilities, insurance and mining firms appear to be unconstrained. We find that firms
that employ between 50-99 employees have a larger credit gap than those that employ
100-499 employees. Similarly, C-corporations and S-corporations experience a greater
credit gap than proprietary and partnership businesses. Also, unlike franchised firms,
independent credit-constrained firms would have 21 percent more debt if credit
constraints were removed. Because the magnitude of credit gap differs across firms,
targeted policy intervention will become more effective as information on the magnitude
of credit constraints among small businesses is made available (Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994)). Information on credit gap will be instrumental in regulating the pool of funds
designated to bank-dependent borrowers under a monetary policy as the “credit” or
“lending” view would suggest.
II.

BACKGROUND

Why are small businesses more likely to be credit constrained? We examine this
question and survey current empirical work on small business lending with an emphasis
on how banks have developed mechanisms to address the issue of information
asymmetry that may contribute to alleviating or somewhat mitigating credit constraint.
Small businesses are generally characterized by the opacity of their operations. Their
owners know more about their business prospects and often have no credible
mechanisms to convey such private information to lenders (Leland and Pyle (1977)).
Mitigating information asymmetry is beneficial both to banks and small firms, and over
time, sophisticated screening and monitoring mechanisms have been developed by
banks to address this issue. Collaterals and guarantees can be viewed as powerful tools
that allow banks to offer credit on favorable terms to small businesses (Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), Bester (1985), Boot et al. (1991), and Diamond (1984)), and some of their
contract features may reduce the cost of intermediation. Banks also use restrictive loan
covenants to address the information problem. Covenants force borrowers to renegotiate
when a strategic opportunity to enhance the value of a loan arises or the financial
condition of the firm changes (Berlin and Loeys (1988), Melnik and Plaut (1986), and
Berlin and Mester (1993)), and prevent borrowers from engaging in risk-shifting
behaviors. Loan maturity can also be used to complement covenants. A sequence of
short maturity loans forces firms to renegotiate contracts at expiration while covenants
are renegotiated only if triggered by conditions enumerated and agreed upon.
Another effective mechanism to ease the informational asymmetry is relationship
lending. Relationship lending is a process in which banks, through continuous contact,
gather private information over several years from a borrowing business (see Boot
(2000)). This information is derived from repayment histories, periodic submissions of
financial statements, renegotiations, visits to banks, and other data associated with
ongoing monitoring. Banks that provide a host of services to a borrowing business may
be able to complement the usual information on credit balance and transaction activity
with payroll data and get a unique perspective on the business’s financial health.
Information specific to owners can be garnered from the provision of personal loans,
credit cards, deposit accounts, trust accounts, and investment services.
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of relationship lending has been slow to
accumulate, largely due to unavailability of reliable data on small business lending.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the NSSBF (1988–1989) to examine benefits of the bank-
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firm relationship on credit availability among small businesses. They find that length of
relationship has little impact on loan rates, but enhances the availability of funds. In a
similar spirit, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the length of relationship lowers both
loan rate premiums above the prime rate and the probability of collateral use. Cole
(1998) also examines the importance of bank-firm relationships to the availability of
credit, and in several ways extends the works of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger
and Udell (1995). He finds that the previous use of a lender as a source of savings
accounts and financial management service increases the likelihood of credit
availability. Findings of Ongena and Smith (2001) from Norway suggest that benefits
from the bank-borrower relationship may be inversely associated with the duration of
relationship. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) do not find any relation between loan price and
length of relation for German midsized companies. Harhoff and Korting (1998)
conclude that a long-lasting relationship and concentrated borrowing were beneficial to
small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany. They also find that duration of
relationship has no impact on the cost of line of credit financing.
III.

EMPIRICAL MODEL

We consider a firm as having its desired level of debt if it is not credit constrained and
holds a positive level of debt (see Cox and Jappelli (1993)). We use the estimates of
desired debt equation for these firms to forecast the desirable level of debt for creditconstrained firms with positive demand for debt. The estimates are likely to be biased, if
a variable that affects a firm being credit constrained or having positive debt also affects
the desired level of debt. For example, a firm with a better relationship with a lender
may not only be less likely to be denied a loan but, relative to firms with similar
prospects, may be able to borrow more.
We adopt a three-step generalized regression procedure which is an extension of
Heckman (1979) by Catsiapis and Robinson (1982), Ham (1982), and Tunali (1985) to
account for two sources of selection bias, jointly determining inclusion in a subsample
used in estimating the desired level of debt. First equation represents the desired credit
equation and the other two are Probit equations that describe the selection rules. For the
ith firm, we have the following specification.
Yi*  1' X1i  1i ,

(1)

1 if i  0
i   '2 X 2i   2i , where i  
,
0 if i  0

(2)

1 if i  0
i  3' X 3i   3i , where i  
.
0 if i  0

(3)

where Yi* is the desired debt for the ith firm, and is observed only for firms that are
unconstrained and have positive levels of debt. X1i is a vector of credit-demand
determinants, such as firm and owner characteristics and bank-firm relationship
variables. The unobservable indices i and i determine whether a firm holds positive
credit and whether a firm is credit constrained, respectively.
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We define a firm to be credit constrained if it replied in the affirmative to one of
the two following questions: (1) “With the most recent loan application, did a bank turn
down the loan application or has the firm been unable to get as much as it applied for?”
and (2) “During the past three years, were there times when the firm needed credit but
did not apply because it thought the application would be turned down?”
Following Cox and Jappelli (1993), we assume that the desired debt for a firm is
observed if the demand for debt is positive and the firm is not credit constrained. X2i is a
vector of credit demand determinants and convenience proxies of using credit, and X 3i is
a vector of credit demand determinants and credit constraint proxies. Convenience and
constraint proxies do not affect the desired debt but affect the probability of a firm’s
holding credit and being unconstrained, respectively. From an empirical standpoint, our
main result depends on the parameter estimates of equation (1). Estimates of equations
(2) and (3) provide probabilities of small firms’ holding debt and being unconstrained,
respectively. These estimates are used to construct the selection terms (inverse Mills
ratios) to estimate equation (1). The inverse Mills ratios from estimates of equations (2)
and (3) are used to correct for sources of sample selection.
The two latent variables i and i admit four categories of firms: (a)
unconstrained firms with positive credit (i = 1 and i = 1), (b) unconstrained firms that
choose not to hold credit (i = 1 and i = 0), (c) constrained firms with credit (i = 0
and i = 1), and (d) constrained firms that do not hold any credit (i = 0 and i = 0).
The estimation strategy is to use the first category (i = 1 and i = 1) of firms to obtain
consistent estimates of the reduced form of desired credit, taking into account the two
sources of sample selection.
The expectation of desired credit for the first group of firms
is E(Yi* | i  1, i  1)  X11  E(1 | i  1, i  1) . We further assume that each error
term is normally distributed with mean zero and variance

 i2 (i=1,

2, 3). Using the

standard Probit normalization ( 2   3  1) , one can obtain consistent estimates
of  2 and  3 . The final estimation equation of Yi* for the subsample can be written as

Yi*  1' X1i  112

(i )
(i )
 113
,
(i )
(i )

(4)

where (i ) (i ) and (i ) (i ) are the inverse Mills ratios. The (.) and (.) are
the probability and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
evaluated at the Probit. The 12 and 13 are the correlation between 1 and 2, and 1 and
3, respectively. The probability of being in the sample is (i)* (i).
Credit gap for a sample of firms is defined as the difference between the average
desired debt ( D * ), and average actual debt as ( D a ).4 D c* is the average desired debt of

credit-constrained firms and can be written as D c*  X c 1 . Equation (4) provides the
estimates for 1 , and X c , the mean of the vector of observable variables for the
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constrained firms, is constructed from the NSSBF data set. Credit gap is estimated as

the difference between actual and desired debt (i.e., Gap c  ( Dc*  Dca ) X c1  Dca ).
IV.

DATA

We use the data from the NSSBF (1993), a survey administered by the Federal Reserve
Bank. The survey has 4,637 observations. It includes 3,355 firms with debt and 2,432
firms that are credit constrained as previously defined. There are 2,196 firms that have
debt and are credit constrained and 1,358 firms that have debt but are not constrained,
while 372 firms have no debt but are constrained and 712 firms have no debt and are not
constrained. After accounting for missing data, our final sample has 4,348 observations
out of 4,637 original observations.5
To estimate the credit gap, we first need to estimate equations (2) through (4),
while controlling for the relationship, firm, and owner characteristics (Peterson and
Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), and Berger and Udell (1995)). Creating a set of desirable
variables to estimate equations (2) through (4) has been a considerable challenge. Given
the interrelationship between presence of credit constraint (equation (2)), incidence of
debt (equation (3)), and the desired debt (equation (4)) it is important to isolate
identifying variables – i.e., variables that affect one of the relationships identified above
but not the other. We have created two sets of proxies – the constraint and the
convenience – to address this issue.6 These proxies are far from optimal and at best can
be considered adequate. Constraint proxies capture variables that may affect the
probability of a firm’s being credit constrained. Data on trade credit denial and
payments to partners are our constraint proxies. Firms that have a history of trade credit
denials may be more likely to be credit constrained, and firms with a history of
significant payments to partners may be able to reschedule these payments and avoid
being credit constrained. Similarly, convenience proxies capture the likelihood of using
debt - firms for which the “convenience” of using debt is relatively high. Data on a
firm’s use of credit cards and the magnitude of internally available funds (the sum of
retained earnings, and checking and savings account balances relative to assets
(BALANCE)) are used as convenience proxies. Each of these variables makes it
possible for firms to do business without borrowing from banks.
We use data on all firms to estimate equations (2) and (3), and data on firms that
have debt and are not credit constrained to estimate equation (4). Table 1 presents
univariate summary statistics of firm, owner, and relationship characteristics, and
constraint and convenience proxies for four regimes of firms – constrained and
unconstrained firms with debt, and constrained and unconstrained firms without debt.
Most firms have been in business for over eleven years, and the years of relationship
with the primary lender and the percentage of firms with checking accounts do not differ
substantially across the four regimes of firms. Sales average about five times total assets
both for firms that hold debt and are credit constrained and for firms that have debt but
are unconstrained. Sales are nearly eight times total assets for firms that do not have
debt. Unconstrained firms with no debt hold significantly less liability than other groups
of firms, while having much larger profit-to-asset ratio, compared with unconstrained
firms with no debt, a greater proportion of other firms were delinquent on business
obligations. Nearly half of the unconstrained firms with no debt are proprietary firms.
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Table 1
Firm, owner, and relationship characteristics and constraint/convenience proxies
Debt
Non-Debt
All Firms Holders Holders Constrained Unconstrained
Total Number of Observations
Ln (Assets)

4,348
12.14

3,355
12.48

993
10.96

2,432
12.57

1,916
11.58

Liabilities/Assets

(2.50)
0.65

(2.21)
0.72

(2.17)
0.43

(2.32)
0.76

(2.16)
0.51

Sales/Assets

(1.35)
5.75

(0.87)
5.05

(2.30)
8.11

(1.74)
5.33

(0.55)
6.29

Profits/Assets

(11.69)
0.75

(10.21)
0.50

(15.40)
1.59

(11.01)
0.55

(12.48)
1.01

(4.67)

(3.25)

(7.61)

(3.50)

(5.80)

0.51

0.51

0.00

0.55!!

0.45!!!

Ln (Firm Age)

(0.68)
2.43

(0.68)
2.42

2.46

(0.79)
2.38

(0.46)
2.49

Firm Delinquent

(0.81)
860

(0.81)
704

(0.82)
156

(0.80)
661

(0.82)
199

Proprietary
S-Corporation

1,330
1,056

877
873

453
183

597
642

733
414

Corporation
Independent

1,646
4,161

1,367
3,182

279
979

1,025
2,328

621
1,834

Ln (Years of Experience)

2.81
(0.67)

2.81
(0.65)

2.81
(0.71)

2.79
(0.65)

2.84
(0.69)

395
779

280
554

115
225

269
406

126
373

541
3,495

414
2,646

127
849

396
1,936

145
1,559

Judgment Against Owner
Owner Bankruptcy

226
119

178
90

48
29

168
64

58
55

# of Financial Institution

2.39
(1.63)

2.60
(1.68)

1.67
(1.16)

2.73
(1.79)

1.96
(1.89)

# of Services (Primary Lender)

3.29
(0.37)

3.64
(0.36)

2.13
(0.41)

3.85
(0.33)

2.59
(0.42)

Ln (Years with Primary Lender)

1.85
(0.89)

1.82
(0.88)

1.92
(0.94)

1.76
(0.87)

1.96
(0.92)

Checking Account
Transaction Service

4,076
1,345

3,113
1,136

963
228

2,248
475

1,828
874

835

675

130

289

540

Debt!!/Assets

African-American Owners
Female Owners
Owner Delinquent (Personal)
Owner-Manager

Trust Service
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Table 1 (continued)
Constraint/Convenience Proxies
331
277
54

Trade Credit Ever Denied

277

54

Partners' Payment/Assets

0.36
(2.65)

0.28
(1.67)

0.61
(4.58)

0.26
(1.43)

0.48
(3.64)

Credit Card - Business
Credit Card - Personal

1,430
1,594

1,183
1,269

247
325

910
965

520
629

0.67

0.52

1.16

0.50

0.88

(3.23)

(2.04)

(5.53)

(1.91)

(4.33)

BALANCEiv/Assets
i

Debt is defined as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds and capital leases.
ii
Of 2,432 firms, 2,090 credit-constrained firms have positive amount of debt.
iii
Of 1,916 firms, 1,265 credit-constrained firms have positive amount of debt.
iv
BALANCE is a sum of checking and savings balances and retained earnings.
Standard deviations are given in brackets.

African-Americans own a large percentage of firms that are constrained and have no
debt. Females own nearly one-fourth of all unconstrained firms with no debt. Owners
who were delinquent on personal obligations own one-fourth of constrained firms with
no debt. Constrained firms with debt receive more services from their primary lenders,
more of them are likely to have trust services, and their checking and savings balances
and retained earnings are nearly one and a quarter times the size of their assets.
V.

ESTIMATION RESULTS

Our empirical work provides estimates of equations needed to estimate credit gap and
also highlights the effects of relationships on small business borrowing behavior in three
different ways: (1) the probabilities of being credit constrained, (2) the incidence of
debt, and (3) the demand for desired debt. Table 2 highlights the effect of lending
relationships on a firm’s being credit constrained. At the mean value of years of
relationship with a primary lender, a 1 percent increase in years of relationship lowers
the probability of credit constraint by 2.1 percent. While older firms face a lower
probability of being credit constrained by a magnitude of 2.7 percent, firms delinquent
on business obligations increase their probability of being credit constrained by 15.4
percent. Empirical results also indicate that owner characteristics such as judgments
against an owner and owner delinquency increase the probability that firms will be
denied credit by 10.6 and 8.9 percent, respectively. Businesses owned by AfricanAmericans have a 12.3 percent greater probability of being credit constrained than other
small businesses. Our result supports findings of Blanchflower et al. (1998) and
Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) that African-American small businesses are more
likely to face some type of discrimination than others are. The trade-credit-denied
variable increases the probability of being credit constrained by 16.9 percent.
Our results of incidence of debt Probit highlight the role of relationship (see
Table 3). Using more services from the primary lender increases the probability of
holding debt, and older firms are less likely to hold debt. The probability of holding debt
increases with liabilities-to-asset ratio, and decreases by 0.2 percent with sales-to-asset
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ratio. A greater profit as a percent of assets decreases the probability of holding debt by
0.3 percent. We also find that firms owned by African-Americans and females have
significantly lower probabilities of holding debt – 5.2 and 4.2, respectively. The
coefficient on the dummy variable for personal credit cards used for business is
significant and, as expected, increases the probability of holding some debt by 3.9
percent.

Table 2
Probit estimates: presence of a credit constraint
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is credit constrained, 0 otherwise. The
independent variables are firm, owner, and relationship characteristics and constrained
proxies. The regression includes a constant. The marginal effects for dummy variables
are the discrete change in them from 0 to 1, and for all other variables it is computed at
their mean values. The following are the estimates of equation (3).
Coefficient

SE

Marginal Effect

0.229 ***
-0.001
-0.068 *
-0.002

0.043
0.002
0.037
0.005

0.090
-0.001
-0.027
-0.001

0.100 **
0.409 ***

0.044
0.063

0.039
0.154

-0.048
0.077
0.328 ***
-0.083
0.233 ***
-0.092
0.281 ***

0.039
0.053
0.078
0.054
0.076
0.118
0.108

-0.019
0.030
0.123
-0.033
0.089
-0.036
0.106

Relationship Characteristics
Checking Accounts
No. of Financial Institutions
Ln (Years with Primary Lender)
No. of Services from Primary Lender

-0.101
0.002
-0.055 *
0.258 ***

0.090
0.017
0.029
0.016

-0.039
0.001
-0.021
0.101

Constraint Proxies
Trade Credit Ever Denied
Partners' Payment/Assets
Log likelihood
Prob > Chi squared

0.461 ***
-0.019
-2,534
0

Firm Characteristics
Liabilities/Assets
Sales/Assets
Ln (Firm age)
Profits/Assets
Corporation
Firm Delinquent
Owner Characteristics
Ln (Years of Experience)
Owner-Manager
African-American
Gender (Female Owner)
Owner Delinquent
Owner Bankruptcy
Judgment Against Owner

* **

, , and *** are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.

0.098
0.014
Pseudo R2
Total observations

0.169
-0.008
0.15
4,348
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Table 3
Probit estimates: incidence of debt
Coefficient

SE

Marginal Effect

Firm Characteristics
Liabilities/Assets
Sales/Assets
Ln (Firm Age)
Profits/Assets
Corporation
Firm Delinquent

0.076
-0.007 **
-0.080 *
-0.011 *
0.096 *
0.057

0.063
0.003
0.044
0.006
0.051
0.069

0.020
-0.002
-0.021
-0.003
0.025
0.015

Owner Characteristics
Ln (Years of Experience)
Owner-Manager
African-American
Gender (Female Owner)
Owner Delinquency
Owner Bankruptcy
Judgment Against Owner

-0.057
-0.094
-0.184 **
-0.153 ***
0.020
-0.041
0.057

0.044
0.062
0.077
0.057
0.079
0.135
0.104

-0.015
-0.024
-0.052
-0.042
0.005
-0.011
0.015

Relationship Characteristics
Checking Accounts
No. of Financial Institutions
Ln (Years with Primary Lender)
No. of Services from Primary Lender

-0.183
0.059 **
-0.005
0.296 ***

0.115
0.027
0.034
0.023

-0.045
0.016
-0.001
0.078

Convenience Proxies
Credit Card/Business
Credit Card/Personal
BALANCE/Assets
Log likelihood
Prob > Chi squared

0.001
0.152 ***
-0.020
-1,971
0

0.052
0.048
0.015
Pseudo R2
Total observations

0.000
0.039
-0.005
0.16
4,348

* **

, , and *** are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Our estimates of desired debt regression show that the length of relationship with
a primary lender matters more than the firm’s age (see Table 4). 7 One percent increases
in the length of relationship with the primary lender increases the debt-asset ratio by
three percentage points, while firm age does not have any significant effect. Though
checking accounts do not affect the demand for debt, we find that using transaction and
trust services decreases the demand for debt -- firms with deep pockets have less
demand for debt. We observe that larger firms are more likely to use these services and
are less likely to have the need to finance investments. 8
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Table 4
Ordinary least square estimates: determinants of firms' debt
The dependent variable is the debt-asset ratio. The subsample includes observations on firms that
have debt and are not credit constrained. The regression also includes seven industry dummies
based on one-digit SIC code, and six of them are significant. The Mills ratios are computed from
the Probit estimates of equations (2) and (3). The following is the estimate of equation (4).
Coefficient

SE

Firm Characteristics
Log (Assets)
Sales/Assets
Ln (Firm age)
Profits/Assets
C-Corporation
S-Corporation
Proprietary
Franchise
Firm Delinquent

-0.055 ***
-0.003 **
0.010
-0.018 ***
-0.013
0.022
0.008
0.024
-0.428 ***

0.007
0.001
0.019
0.003
0.046
0.047
0.046
0.050
0.049

Owner Characteristics
Owner-Manager
African-American
Asian/Pacific Islander
Gender (Female Owner)
Owner Bankruptcy
Owner Delinquent
Judgment Against Owner

-0.155 ***
-0.580 ***
0.071 *
-0.064 **
0.082
-0.218 ***
-0.291 ***

0.030
0.054
0.040
0.030
0.066
0.049
0.068

Relationship Characteristics
Checking Accounts
No. of Financial Institutions
Ln (Years with Primary Lender)
Transaction Services
Trust Services
Selection Term - Credit Constrained
Selection Term - Incidence of Debt
Total observations

-0.038
0.000
0.030 *
-0.109 ***
-0.145 ***
-3.037 ***
5.403 ***
1,265

0.049
0.012
0.017
0.030
0.035
0.183
0.474
R2 = 0.25

* **

, , and *** are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Our results also suggest that both sources of censoring render the sample
nonrandom. The sign pattern for the selection terms conforms our conjecture. The
positive coefficient for the selection term for debt incidence implies a positive
correlation between errors in the Probit for incidence of debt and the regression for
desired debt. As expected, the results confirm that the unobserved factors that increase
the probability of holding debt also increase the demand for desired debt. The
coefficient on the credit-constrained selection term implies a negative correlation
between unobservable variables in the Probit for being constrained and those in the
regression for desired debt. Therefore, the unobserved factors that increase the
probability of being credit constrained reduce the demand for desired debt.

76

Chakraborty and Mallick

Table 5
Estimation of credit gap
This table presents estimates of the credit gap for constrained firms with positive demand for debt.
The magnitude of credit gap is desired debt as a percentage of actual debt (see Section VI for
more details). The estimated credit gap is stratified by industries based on one-digit SIC code,
number of employees, and forms and types of corporate governance. Desired debt is computed by
multiplying predicted debt-asset ratios with total assets.
Desired Debt1

Actual Debt1

Extent of Gap2 (%)

15

9,723

9,135

106%

Construction
Manufacturing

239
311

602
3,006

492
2,053

122%
146% ***

Utilities & Transportation
Wholesale Trade

99
219

1,281
1,593

1,917
1,253

67%
127% *

Retail Trade
Insurance

440
124

1,019
1,594

937
1,594

109%
100%

Service
Firm Size by Employment

642

765

622

123% **

1,107
254

207
787

234
716

89%
110%

50 - 99
100 - 499

361
327

1,875
5,064

1,421
4,250

Corporate Governance
Proprietary

452

137

132

Partnership
S-Corporation

146
573

1,651
1,292

2,309
1,081

72%
120% **

Corporation
Independent/Franchise

919

1,952

1,469

133% ***

Independent
Franchise

1,986
104

1,330
1,886

1,101
1,719

121% ***
110%

Overall

2,090

1,358

1,132

120% ***

# of Firms
Industry
Mining

0 - 19
20 - 49

1

132% ***
119% **
104%

2

The debt figures are in thousands of dollars. The extent of credit gap is desired debt as a percentage of
actual debt. ***, ** and * signifying the difference between desired and actual debt is significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent, respectively.

Our estimates indicate that credit-constrained firms with positive demand for debt
have an average desired debt of $1,357,701. Small businesses would acquire on average
20 percent more debt if the credit constraints were removed (see Table 5). However, we
find that there is a substantial variation in the desired debt across the sample. For
example, service firms have the lowest average desired debt level, $764,836, and
manufacturing firms have the highest levels of debt, $3,006,222. Desired debt also
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varies substantially across the size of small businesses. Small businesses that employ
more than 99 employees have an estimated desired debt of $5,064,747, but it falls to
$1,875,420 for firms employing 50 and 99 employees. Similarly, desired debt for Scorporations is about two-thirds of what C-corporations have.
Our results indicate that manufacturing firms might increase their debt by nearly
half if they could borrow more, whereas within the wholesale and service firms the debt
levels would go up by 27 and 23 percent, respectively. Utilities, transportation,
insurance, mining, and the retail sectors of small businesses experience no significant
credit gap. Given that our findings pertain to an era of credit tightening, it is not
surprising that the manufacturing sector is found to be severely credit constrained
(Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2000)). Results for the utility sector may reflect that it is
usually not affected by general credit-tightening policies, and may resonate with the
findings of Krishana, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) that utilities require little external
financing relative to firms in other sectors, by virtue of their natural monopoly status.
Figure 1 shows that there are distinct differences in the median values of the desired
debt across industries. Individual series show some skewness, and in some cases the
long appendages indicate the presence of long tails. The upper and lower quartiles also
differ across the industries. More importantly, we record outliers in two industries.

Figure 1
Box-and-whisker plots of desired debt for one-digit industries
(Box width proportional to number of firms in the industries)
20

Log of desired debt

17.5

15

12.5

10

7.5

5
1

3
2

5
4

7
6

8

1 = Mining, 2 = Construction, 3 = Manufacturing, 4 = Utilities & Transportation,
5 = Wholesale Trade, 6 = Retail Trade, 7 = Insurance, and 8 = Service.

VII.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings indicate that credit-constrained small businesses face an average credit gap
of 20 percent. As expected, firms with limited credit, shorter histories, and poor
financial statements face tighter credit situations, consistent with various theoretical
models of credit availability such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Stiglitz and Weiss
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(1981). The magnitude of credit gap varies considerably across industries, size of firm,
and the nature of business organization. Manufacturing firms face an average credit gap
of 46 percent, while the credit gap for services and wholesale firms is estimated at 23
and 27 percent, respectively. Corporations on average have higher credit gaps than
partnerships or proprietary small businesses. Our study indicates that an effective
segmentation of small businesses according to their expected credit gaps would be
essential to alleviating credit crunches and foster entrepreneurship.
The methodology used to obtain the results accommodates the nonrandom nature
of the subsample (selection biases) used to estimate firms’ demand for desired debt (i.e.,
firms that have positive debt and are not credit constrained). We achieve this by
adopting an extension of Heckman’s correction procedure for multiple selections. We
find that both sources of sample selection bias—the unobserved factors that increase the
probability of a firm’s holding debt and the unobserved factors that increase the
probability of its being credit constrained—are statistically significant.
ENDNOTES
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

See, for example, Jaffee and Modigliani (1966), Jaffee (1971), Slovin and Sushka
(1983), King (1986), Sofianos et al. (1990), and Stein (2002).
Berkowitz and White (1999) examine the effect of personal bankruptcy on small
businesses’ access to credit. Squires and O’Connor (1999) examine lending gap
among small businesses in Milwaukee metropolitan area.
Cole (2010) models the credit allocation process among small businesses and
comments on “non-borrowers” as these firms account for a large segment of the
small businesses but has received limited attention in the literature.
We define actual debt (or credit) as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages,
notes, bonds, and capital leases.
The variable representing the length of relationship with a primary lender has 221
missing observations. Missing observations for the checking account, the number
of financial services from a primary lender, and the years of owner experience are
151, 98 and 18, respectively.
Cole (2009) discusses some the situations that may prohibit or prevent a small
business from applying for credit.
We also ran a regression with data on firms that are only credit constrained results
of which are available on request. Most of the coefficient estimates of the
regression are comparable to those presented in Table 4.
Cole (2008) shows that the leverage is negatively related to the firm size.
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